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FROM AFFORDABLE TO PROFITABLE: THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING & HOW THE NEW YORK 
COURT OF APPEALS GOT IT WRONG 
Camille Rosca 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the upturn in the economy since the 2008 financial crisis, 
demand for residential real estate in New York City has increased, 
resulting in heightened tensions with the city’s efforts to maintain 
affordable housing units, especially for low- and middle-income 
individuals.  Specifically, New York City must confront the increasing 
loss of affordable housing through the conversions of public and quasi-
public units to private, for-profit accommodations in light of the 
growing demand for residential space and the high return of these 
conversions.  In addition to factors like income and rental rates, the 
general availability of housing stock—which is directly affected by 
these for-profit conversions—significantly impacts whether New York 
City can maintain affordable housing for future years.  Based on a 
combination of these factors (e.g., income, rental rates, and availability 
of housing stock), a recent study indicates that New York City now 
ranks thirty-first among the seventy-six largest cities with regard to 
gross rent-to-income ratios, demonstrating the pressing reality of New 
York City’s affordable housing dilemma.1 
Generally, housing is considered affordable when a household 
pays no more than thirty percent of its income to rent; the 2011 
Housing and Vacancy Survey (“HVS”), however, reported that the 
median gross rent-to-income ratio for all renters in New York City was 
 
 J.D. candidate, 2015, Seton Hall School of Law; B.A., 2011, Villanova University.  I 
would extend my deepest appreciation to Professor Angela C. Carmella for her 
continued guidance and assistance in helping to shape this comment to completion 
and to Erica F. Buckley, Bureau Chief at the Office of the Attorney General of the State 
of New York, for providing me with the opportunity to learn about the Mitchell-Lama 
housing program.  
 1  2014 Income and Affordability Study, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD. 3, 8–9 
(Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_ 
reports/ia14.pdf (“Despite ongoing efforts by a number of government agencies and 
non-profit groups, housing affordability remains an issue . . . .”). 
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33.6 percent.2  This ratio means that half of all households residing in 
rental housing pay more than 33.6 percent of their income to gross 
rent, placing New York City rental housing outside the purview of 
housing that is considered affordable.3  Furthermore, the cost of living 
in New York City as compared to larger cities nationwide is high.  
According to the Council for Community and Economic Research’s 
Cost of Living Index (“COLI”), which tracks the cost of living in more 
than 300 urban areas, Manhattan is approximately 2.2 times more 
expensive to live in than the national average, Brooklyn is 
approximately 1.7 times more expensive, and Queens is roughly 1.5 
times more expensive.4  This same study found that significantly more 
income is required to live in New York City even compared to Boston, 
given the same living standards.5  Someone moving from Boston who 
makes $51,642 a year would need to make $81,978 to have the same 
living conditions in Manhattan with respect to groceries, 
transportation, and housing.6  The Housing Opportunity Index 
(“HOI”) also found that between 2008 and 2012, the New York City 
metropolitan area was the least affordable area to buy a home in for 
the eighteenth straight quarter.7  Therefore, preserving affordable 
housing units in New York City is imperative, especially for low- and 
middle-income families, given that the general living costs in the city 
are high even in comparison to other large cities nationwide. 
In addition to analyzing the rent-to-income ratio as a measure of 
New York City’s need to maintain and provide affordable housing, 
poverty and unemployment rates are also significant indicators.  For 
example, while the New York City unemployment rate fell to 8.7 
percent in 2013 (after a 0.2 percentage point increase in 2012), it still 
remained above the U.S. unemployment rate of 7.4 percent.8  This 1.3 
percentage point difference between the city’s unemployment rate 
and the national unemployment rate is the largest gap between the two 
 
 2  2013 Income and Affordability Study, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD. 3, 9 
(Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_ 
reports/ia13.pdf; see also 2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 8.  
 3  2013 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 2, at 8–9 (stating that for 2011, the 
median income for all rental households was $38,447, and rent-controlled tenants 
continued to have the lowest household income, earning a median of $28,000 in 
2010). 
 4  2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 5  Id. at 11.  
 6  Id. 
 7  Id.  
 8  Id. at 5.   
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figures since 2004.9  Moreover, the Census Bureau reports that the New 
York City poverty rate for all individuals was 21.2 percent in 2012, an 
increase from 20.9 percent in the previous year and 5.3 percent higher 
than the national poverty rate.10  Poverty rates, however, vary widely 
depending on the borough.  Rates range from as low as 11.6 percent 
in Staten Island to 31.0 percent in the Bronx.11  Nevertheless, these 
statistics indicate that maintaining affordable housing in New York City 
has become a challenge considering the high cost of living and the 
growing disparity between rent and income. 
Yet, despite the high poverty and unemployment rates in certain 
boroughs, a shortage of affordable housing stock remains.  According 
to the HVS of 2011, the New York City vacancy rate for housing 
inventory was 3.12 percent, which was below the five percent threshold 
required for rent regulation to continue under state law.12  This low 
vacancy rate translates into the availability of just 67,818 vacant units 
out of more than 2.1 million rental units city-wide.13 
In addition to the limited housing stock, New York City also faces 
poor housing conditions due to overcrowding.  For example, 11.5 
percent of all rental housing in New York City in 2011 was overcrowded 
(defined as more than one person per room, on average) and 4.3 
percent was severely overcrowded (defined as an average of more than 
1.5 persons per room).14  Thus, even the current housing units in use 
for the purpose of providing affordable housing implicate quality 
concerns due to the large volume of residents forced to live in limited 
spaces.  Any further erosion of affordable housing stock would not only 
prevent certain families from receiving affordable housing, but it 
would also increase the current problem of overcrowding. 
In an attempt to provide much needed low-cost, sanitary housing, 
New York City has created different forms of housing units and passed 
legislation, including both public housing and rent control laws.  The 
purpose of public housing is to provide decent and safe rental housing 
for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities.15  Public housing comes in all sizes and types, from 
 
 9  Id. 
 10  2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 7–8 (discussing that the 
national poverty rate was “15.9% for the nation as a whole in both 2011 and 2012”).  
 11  Id. 
 12  2014 Housing Supply Report, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD 3 (May 29, 
2014), available at http://nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_reports/14HSR.pdf. 
 13  Id.  
 14  Id. at 4.  
 15  HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
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scattered single family houses to high-rise apartments for the elderly.16  
Unlike private apartments subject to rent control laws, public housing 
is built and maintained by a government authority or office.17  In 
contrast, rent control laws operate in the private sector by protecting 
vulnerable tenants living in privately operated units from excessive or 
sudden increases in rent.18  Public housing and private units regulated 
by rent control laws are only two examples of how both private and 
public efforts are essential to maintaining affordable housing for the 
future. 
Limited dividend housing is another type of affordable housing 
created through a combination of public and private efforts.  Chapter 
823 of the State Housing Law of 1926 establishes limited dividend 
housing for the purpose of correcting housing conditions that were 
considered a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and 
reasonable comfort of the citizens of the state.19  The limited dividend 
housing program encouraged the development of safe and affordable 
housing by providing developers with real estate tax exemptions for a 
period of up to fifty years in exchange for a six percent limitation on 
profits.20  The existence of these different types of housing 
accommodations demonstrates that each model and legislation plays a 
different but significant role in preserving affordable housing in New 
York City. 
This Comment specifically focuses on the housing units formed 
under Article II of the New York Private Housing Finance Law 
(“PHFL”).  The PHFL is a compilation of various programs relating to 
state and municipal assistance for housing developed by private 
entities, which were previously contained in the Public Housing Law 
or had been enacted as separate unconsolidated laws.21  In 1955, 
 
DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog. 
 16  Id.  
 17  Jennifer C. McScotts, Dwelling Together: Using Cooperative Housing to Abate the 
Affordable Housing Shortage in Canada and the United States, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
131, 137 (2004). 
 18  Id. at 140. 
 19  Gail Benzman & Christopher Boyd, Affordable No More: New York City’s Looming 
Crisis in Mitchell-Lama and Limited Dividend Housing, CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER 1, 6 (Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/Feb18-04_Mitchell-Lama_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
Affordable No More]. 
 20  Id. at 7. 
 21  David J. Sweet & John D. Hack, Mitchell-Lama Buyout: Policy Issues and Alternatives, 
17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 117 n.1 (1989). 
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Senator MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman Alfred Lama sponsored 
legislation to amend the PHFL with the addition of Article II, 
establishing another type of affordable housing known as Mitchell-
Lama housing.22  In 1961, the legislature amended the PHFL again to 
incorporate the already-existing limited dividend housing program 
and placed the PHFL under the supervision of the Department of 
Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”).23  With both limited 
dividend housing and Mitchell-Lama housing, these programs built 
292 housing developments (totaling more than 149,000 units of 
affordable housing) in New York City between 1928 and 1978; the vast 
majority of these developments, after 1955, were Mitchell-Lama 
housing.24  For both programs, the respective supervising agencies 
strictly controlled cooperative maintenance charges and rent increases 
to ensure their long-term affordability.25 
Presently, much-needed affordable housing stock, specifically 
Mitchell-Lama housing, is at risk of being lost.  Housing developments 
representing more than 6,500 units of affordable housing are in the 
process of leaving the supervision of Mitchell-Lama and limited 
dividend housing programs.26  From an estimation provided by the 
New York City Comptroller, at least fifty-nine Mitchell-Lama 
developments, representing 40,000 units of affordable housing, are 
scheduled to retire their subsidized mortgages and withdraw from the 
Mitchell-Lama program between 2004 and 2016.27  Between 2004 and 
2007 alone, the Mitchell-Lama program has experienced an annual 
loss of more than 5,000 units.28  Throughout New York City, HVS 
estimates that existing vacancy rates could not begin to meet the 
growing demand for affordable housing.29  The Census reported that 
in some areas of New York City, there is virtually no vacant affordable 
housing stock.30 
In light of the pressing public policy concerns to preserve 
affordable housing, like Mitchell-Lama housing, government efforts 
 
 22  Maria Cristiano Anderson & Paula A. Franzese, Article: Solutions to the Crisis in 
Affordable Housing: Proposed Model for New York City, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. PUB. POL’Y 84, 
87–88 (2006).   
 23  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 3. 
 24  Id.  
 25  Id.  
 26  Id. at 16.  
 27  Id. 
 28  2014 Housing Supply Report, supra note 12, at 8. 
 29  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 16. 
 30  Id.  
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should focus on maintaining the limited affordable housing stock that 
remains.  This includes prohibiting individuals from converting 
Mitchell-Lama housing into private market rate housing without 
realizing the tax consequences of these transfers.  Courts have recently 
had the opportunity to interpret state and city tax laws in favor of 
preserving much needed affordable housing stock (in the form of 
Mitchell-Lama housing).  But the New York Court of Appeals did 
precisely the opposite when, on December 17, 2014, it affirmed the 
holding in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, an appellate 
court decision to privatize Mitchell-Lama housing without tax 
consequences.31  This decision severely undermined the urgent need 
to preserve affordable housing in New York City. 
Mitchell-Lama housing consists of both rental projects and 
cooperatives, but this Comment focuses primarily on the dissolution of 
Mitchell-Lama cooperatives, specifically the means by which these 
cooperatives exit out of the Mitchell-Lama program.  The purpose of 
this Comment is to demonstrate how Trump Village Section 3, Inc. was 
wrongly decided.  In this case, the Court of Appeals interpreted the 
relevant state and tax laws to permit Mitchell-Lama housing companies 
to take advantage of real estate tax exemptions both in the initial 
formation of the Mitchell-Lama housing company and now at the 
dissolution stage.  This decision prevents New York City from collecting 
necessary tax revenue and incentivizes other Mitchell-Lama 
cooperatives to privatize in a manner that circumvents real property 
transfer tax requirements.  Specifically, this Comment demonstrates 
that the way a Mitchell-Lama cooperative dissolves and reconstitutes 
into a private market rate cooperative is analogous to how a private 
corporation dissolves and reincorporates into a new corporation for 
both tax and securities law purposes.  In contrast to its holding, the 
Court of Appeals should have recognized these conversions to 
constitute “transfers” under the relevant tax laws.  Thus, these 
conversions should be subject to the same tax consequences that would 
be implicated if a private housing corporation outside the Mitchell-
Lama program had attempted to dissolve. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the importance of preserving 
Mitchell-Lama housing stock.  Part III of this Comment provides 
background about Article II of the PHFL and how the Mitchell-Lama 
Housing Program operates.  It also discusses a prior New York Court 
of Appeals decision, which already recognized the dissolution of a 
 
 31  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014). 
ROSCA(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:10 PM 
2015] COMMENT 951 
 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative as an “offering” under securities law, 
subjecting the dissolution of these cooperatives to disclosure 
requirements and supervision by the New York State Attorney General.  
Part IV of this Comment provides the factual background of Trump 
Village Section 3, Inc. and its procedural history.  Part V of this Comment 
discusses how the New York Court of Appeals wrongly decided Trump 
Village Section 3, Inc.  It also offers reasons for why the relevant real 
property transfer taxes should apply to all Mitchell-Lama for-profit 
cooperative conversions, regardless of how the privatization is 
effectuated.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING 
COOPERATIVES 
Mitchell-Lama Housing is a successful and unique form of 
affordable housing.  The program’s inception was the first time a law 
in New York authorized state and local low-cost loans for private 
middle-income housing developments, in addition to condemnation 
and tax exemptions, and it appropriated $50 million for this purpose.32  
Combined with the extensive federal subsidies available under Title I 
of the 1949 Housing Act, the Mitchell-Lama program eventually 
produced 269 developments across the state with more than 105,000 
units.33  Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing falls under the category of 
“social housing” which is non-profit and non-governmental housing.34  
Sometimes, however, social housing is affected by government 
intervention through subsidies or privatization programs, which is how 
Mitchell-Lama cooperatives are able to operate at below-market-rate 
rent costs.35  These types of limited equity housing cooperatives are 
powerful options for communities organizing against gentrification 
and displacement because, while they are supported by government 
intervention, they still empower the tenants by providing a vehicle for 
ownership in real property.36 
New York City is not the only place that has attempted to use 
models of social housing, like Mitchell-Lama cooperatives, to confront 
the issue of affordable housing.  For example, the Canadian National 
Housing Act (“CNHA”) provides the means for cooperative 
 
 32  Amy Lavine, From Slum Clearance to Economic Development: A Retrospective of 
Redevelopment Policies in New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 212, 249 (2011). 
 33  Id.  
 34  McScotts, supra note 17, at 138. 
 35  Id.  
 36  Id. at 150. 
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development aimed at the purpose of affordable housing.37  Housing 
cooperatives created under Section 95 of the CNHA are considerably 
less expensive to operate when compared to similar public housing.38  
The difference in cost can be attributed to the fact that housing in 
Canada leans toward mixed income communities while public housing 
is strictly low income.39  Operating a Section 95 cooperative is twenty 
percent less expensive than public or private non-profit housing, 
possibly because cooperatives are tenant-managed rather than 
controlled by staff like non-profits.40  The success of affordable housing 
options in Canada through limited and zero profit cooperatives 
demonstrates the necessary role that limited-profit housing companies 
play in maintaining affordable housing, especially for New York City. 
The affordable housing issue in New York City will not be 
remedied by only public housing or social housing alone; rather, the 
vitality of both types of housing stock are crucial to the maintenance 
of affordable housing for both lower- and middle-income families.  
Exercise of a voluntary dissolution under § 35 of the PHFL can 
produce two related results, both of which raise controversial public 
policy questions.41  First, a Mitchell-Lama owner can reap a potentially 
great profit from what was intended to be a government program for 
middle-income housing.42  Second, middle-income tenants who live in 
buildings that have dissolved and reconstituted as completely private 
market rate housing may be forced to move out because of increased 
rent or maintenance costs.43  Even if present tenants are protected, 
apartments that become vacant will no longer be set aside.44  
Therefore, Mitchell-Lama housing is essential to the success of 
preserving affordable housing in New York City, both because of the 
quantity of units it provides and because of the kind of living 
arrangement it offers to tenants. 
III.  ABOUT MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING, THE DISSOLUTION PROCESS, 
AND EAST MIDTOWN PLAZA HOUSING CO. V. CUOMO 
A.  Creation of Mitchell-Lama Housing, Oversight, and the Buyout 
 
 37  Id. at 153. 
 38  Id. at 154. 
 39  Id.  
 40  McScotts, supra note 17, at 154.   
 41  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 120–21. 
 42  Id.  
 43  Id.  
 44  Id.  
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Provision 
Sponsored by State Senator MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman 
Alfred Lama, Article II of the New York Private Housing Finance Law 
(commonly known as the “Mitchell-Lama Housing Program”) was 
enacted in 1955 and governs limited-profit housing companies within 
the state of New York.45  In response to the scarcity of affordable, safe, 
and sanitary housing, the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program serves to 
increase the development of adequate housing accommodations for 
low- and middle-income families.46  Unlike traditional forms of public 
housing that are largely operated by government agencies and funded 
primarily by government financing, the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program seeks to foster cooperation between both the public and 
private sectors “through the most effective and economical 
concentration and coordination of Federal, State, local and private 
resources and efforts.”47  Thus, the program is designed to encourage 
private enterprises to invest in housing companies that are subject to 
laws regulating their rents, profits, dividends and dispositions of 
property.48 
The Mitchell-Lama Housing Program’s collaborative efforts 
between government and private enterprises work through the city and 
state’s provision of low-interest and long-term mortgages to private 
housing companies that finance up to ninety-five percent of total 
development costs.49  Additionally, under the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program, private developers also may receive certain real estate tax 
 
 45  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5; see also N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 10 
(McKinney 2013).  
 46  See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11 (“[T]here exists in municipalities in this state 
a seriously inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling or non-housekeeping 
accommodations for families and persons of low income . . . due, in large measure, to 
over-crowding and concentration of the population, improper planning, excessive 
land coverage, lack of proper light, air and space, improper sanitary facilities and 
inadequate protection from fire hazards.”); Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5. 
 47  N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11-a (“It is the purpose of this article to enable 
municipalities to undertake projects directly or in combination with the Federal 
government, private enterprise and any of the other responsible components of the 
community, to accomplish the public purposes herein described through the most 
effective and economical concentration and coordination of Federal, State, local and 
private resources and efforts.”). 
 48  N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11 (“[R]equire that provision be made by which 
private free enterprise may be encouraged to invest in companies regulated by law as 
to rents, profits, dividends and disposition of their property or franchises and engaged 
in providing such housing facilities and other facilities incidental or appurtenant 
thereto for families or persons of low income.”). 
 49  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5 (citing N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW §§ 22(2), 
23(1)). 
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exemptions depending on the municipality.50  In exchange for these 
benefits, the government requires Mitchell-Lama projects to comply 
with guidelines that limit their profits, including rent regulations that 
set the minimum and maximum rent prices based upon a tenant’s 
annual income rather than market rates.51 
To ensure adherence to the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program 
guidelines and regulations, government agencies oversee the housing 
project’s compliance.  The type of government agency that conducts 
this supervision is dependent upon which type of loan is financed to 
the housing project.  For example, the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (“HPD”) supervises housing projects 
with New York City mortgages, whereas the Department of Housing 
and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) supervises projects with state 
mortgages.52  The responsibilities of these agencies include collecting 
debt service payments on loans, setting rent prices, reviewing project 
expenditures, and generally enforcing regulations that govern their 
specific developments.53  In addition, DHCR also publishes an Annual 
Report with the names of all of the current Mitchell-Lama housing 
projects and their original mortgage information, rent per unit, and 
number of dwelling units.54 
Along with stipulating the guidelines for participating in the 
program, the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program also provides 
instructions on how a housing project may exit the program.  Although 
its original enactment included this procedure for withdrawal, the 
initial Mitchell-Lama housing statute prior to 1959 made exiting the 
program very difficult since mortgage pre-payments to effectuate a 
withdrawal were nearly impossible.55  Before a Mitchell-Lama housing 
company could dissolve and withdraw from the program, it had to 
meet the following conditions: (1) receive approval from the state or 
municipal regulatory agency involved in its oversight; (2) ensure that 
 
 50  N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 33 (“Upon the consent of the local legislative body 
of any municipality in which a project is or is to be located, the real property in a 
project shall be exempt from local and municipal taxes, other than assessments for 
local improvements, to the extent of all or part of the value of the property included 
in such project which represents an increase over the assessed valuation of the real 
property, both land and improvements, acquired for the project at the time of its 
acquisition by the limited-profit housing company.”). 
 51  Anderson & Franzese, supra note 22, at 87–88 (citing Affordable No More, supra 
note 19, at 5). 
 52  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5. 
 53  Id.  
 54  Id.  
 55  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 123. 
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thirty-five years had passed since the occupancy date; and (3) repay to 
the municipality the total of all tax benefits that the project had 
received.56  As a result, attempting to exit out of the Mitchell-Lama 
Housing Program prior to 1959 was complicated and potentially 
profitless.57 
Because the original scheme for the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program failed to create a significant number of affordable housing 
projects, the legislature reacted by providing further incentives to 
developers through the addition of an initial “buyout” provision.58  
Under this amendment, owners of Mitchell-Lama projects had “the 
option of dissolving the housing company on or after the fifteenth 
anniversary of the occupancy date.”59  Additionally, a housing company 
no longer needed consent from its respective regulatory agency for 
dissolution, but still had to repay its government mortgage and 
surrender its future tax exemptions.60  Even more enticing for 
developers was that the 1959 amendment waived repayment of the tax 
benefits previously received by the housing company.61  Subsequently, 
the legislature amended this buyout provision in 1960 to increase the 
minimum period before which a housing company may exit the 
program from fifteen to twenty years.  It also extended this buyout 
privilege to projects with both municipal and state loans.62  Today, 
these amendments only encourage the recent trend in Mitchell-Lama 
housing dissolutions that is threatening the preservation of this type of 
affordable housing.  Dissolution would not only yield high profits in 
light of the demand for more real estate space in New York City, but 
the actual process for dissolving is now easier. 
B. Dissolution and Reconstitution 
Section 35 of the PHFL governs the process for withdrawal from 
the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program (statutorily referred to as 
“dissolution”).63  The current legislation, which includes the 1959 and 
1960 amendments, effectuates dissolution by requiring developments 
with loans made prior to May 1, 1959 to abide by the original, stricter 
 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 124. 
 59  Id.  
 60  Id.  
 61  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 124. 
 62  Id. 
 63  N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35 (McKinney 2013). 
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dissolution process.  This former dissolution process required the 
housing company to remain in the program for thirty-five years 
regardless of whether the original mortgage was paid in full.64  
Developments with loans made after May 1, 1959 may take advantage 
of the 1959 and 1960 amendments by opting to buyout of the program 
after twenty years from the occupancy date, assuming prepayment of 
the mortgage and all indebtedness.65 
Although § 35 of the PHFL no longer requires post-1959 
developments to obtain formal “consent” from their respective 
supervising agencies in order to proceed with dissolution, state and city 
regulatory agencies have enacted procedures to oversee the 
dissolution process.66  Procedurally, the housing development must 
provide a “notice of intent” one year in advance of dissolution to both 
its respective supervising agency and tenants67 along with detailed 
information about the present and proposed future status of the 
development.68  Subsequent to disseminating the notice of intent, 
submitting any required documentation to the agency, and receiving 
notice from the agency to proceed to the next step, the project 
owner(s) may hold a public information meeting.69  The project owner 
must provide notice of the public meeting to both tenants and public 
officials, including state legislators who represent the district where the 
housing development is located.70  Additionally, for the protection of 
tenants, regulations exist to govern applicable transitions into rent 
stabilization laws post-dissolution.71  As part of procedure, the local 
taxing authorities will also terminate tax exemptions upon dissolution, 
and the housing development owners must pay any fees owing under 
the program.72  The process concludes when the DHCR (or HPD) 
 
 64  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6; N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(1).  
 65  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6; N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(2). 
 66  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126 (“In 1987, faced with the initial group of 
Mitchell-Lama buyouts, New York State and New York City issued regulations 
governing withdrawal from the program.”). 
 67  Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6 (citing N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9 § 1750 (1988)); 
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 28 § 3-14(i) (2012).  
 68  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126.  
 69  Id. 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id.  See also Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6 (“If a housing project was 
occupied prior to January 1, 1974, upon its buy out buildings that were occupied on 
or after January 1, 1974 are not afforded any rental protections under the law and the 
units become market rate housing.  Tenants, however, may receive federal assistance 
to cover increases if the developments originally received Federal Section 236 or 
Section 8 housing assistance.”). 
 72  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126.  
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issues a certificate to the Secretary of State that the housing 
development owner(s) satisfied all legal prerequisites and that the 
agency has “no objections” to the dissolution.73  Despite these elaborate 
procedural barriers that may appear to be an obtainment of “consent” 
from the supervising agency, these procedures do not confer power to 
the regulatory agency to reject an application for dissolution if the 
development’s owner(s) meet the statutory requirements.74 
The basic process for dissolution applies to both rental and 
cooperative projects, but additional requirements exist for cooperative 
developments.75  Unlike rental property, cooperatives function without 
a sole owner; rather, cooperatives operate similar to a corporation 
where the residents are both the tenants and the shareholder-owners 
of the housing company.76  Therefore, the housing company must 
receive approval from its shareholders to expend money for 
preliminary steps toward dissolution, such as paying for a 
comparability study.77  In addition, according to the New York Court of 
Appeals, the New York State Attorney General (“Attorney General”) 
has the authority to oversee these types of Mitchell-Lama conversions 
to ensure appropriate public disclosure and adherence to securities 
law, requiring the Mitchell-Lama cooperative to file an offering plan 
with the Attorney General if it is exercising its voluntary dissolution 
rights.78  Finally, once the housing company has filed an offering plan 
which has been approved by both the Attorney General and its 
respective supervising agency, it must also hold a shareholder vote and 
receive a two-thirds majority to effectuate the corporate act of 
dissolution.79 
Apart from the procedural and statutory requirements for 
voluntary dissolution, Mitchell-Lama cooperatives that opt to exit from 
the program may become a privatized corporation in two ways.  
Traditionally, the old housing cooperative incorporated under the 
Mitchell-Lama Housing Program that wishes to become a private 
cooperative upon dissolution may transfer all its assets to a newly 
 
 73  Id.  
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. at 127. 
 76  DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 898 (7th ed. 2010) (“In a housing cooperative, the 
title to the land and building is held by a corporation; the residents own all the shares 
of stock in the corporation and control it through an elected board of directors.”).  
 77  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 127 (citing NYCRR Tit. 9 § 1750.7-13(d)).  
 78  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 244–45 (N.Y. 
2012). 
 79  Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 127 (citing NYCRR Tit. 9 § 1750.7-13(d)). 
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reconstituted for-profit cooperative.80  Alternatively, Mitchell-Lama 
cooperatives are now attempting dissolution and reconstitution by 
simply amending their certificates of incorporation and removing all 
references to the PHFL.81  This amendment of the cooperative’s 
certificate of incorporation is now being used to avoid paying real 
estate transfer taxes with housing companies, arguing that the 
transaction is not a “transfer or conveyance” of interests in real 
property.82  Because owners are using this method to avoid tax liability, 
this second option for privatization is now under scrutiny. 
C. East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo: The Mitchell-Lama 
Dissolution (and Reconstitution) Process is an “Offer and Sale” 
under Securities Law 
East Midtown Plaza Housing Company (“East Midtown”) was a 
Manhattan housing cooperative organized under the Mitchell-Lama 
Housing Program with 746 units spanning across six buildings.83  East 
Midtown attempted to invoke its voluntary dissolution rights under 
PHFL § 35.84  In 2004, East Midtown originally proposed to dissolve and 
privatize by transferring its assets to a newly-incorporated private 
cooperative with a formal issuance of new shares.85  Because the 
housing cooperative held a shareholder vote for privatization prior to 
filing a cooperative offering plan with the Attorney General’s office, 
both the Attorney General and the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (the cooperative’s supervising agency) 
 
 80  N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(3) (“Upon such dissolution, title to the project 
may be conveyed in fee to the owner or owners of its capital stock or to any corporation 
designated by it or them for the purpose, or the company may be reconstituted 
pursuant to appropriate laws relating to the formation and conduct of corporations.”).  
 81  See E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 243 (“Under the [2004] proposed 
privatization plan, East Midtown would dissolve and all its assets would be transferred 
to a newly incorporated private cooperative, accompanied by a formal issuance of new 
shares in the entity . . . Unlike the 2004 proposal, the 2008 plan did not contemplate 
a transfer of property or a physical exchange of shares.  Rather, the privatization was 
to be effectuated by an amendment to East Midtown’s certificate of incorporation.”).  
 82  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1087 (N.Y. 2014) 
(“Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, among other things, a declaratory 
judgment that the RPTT is inapplicable because the tax applies only to transfers and 
conveyances of real property or economic interests in real property, from one entity 
to another, and not to plaintiff’s exit from the Mitchell-Lama program as a result of a 
‘reconstitution.’”).  
 83  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 242–43. 
 84  Id.  
 85  Id.  
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held the vote improper for failing to abide by dissolution procedures.86  
In 2008, after following the proper procedural sequence, the Attorney 
General accepted East Midtown’s offering plan.  Instead of dissolving 
and transferring shares to a new private cooperative, however, East 
Midtown revised its original proposal to effectuate privatization 
through amending its certificate of incorporation without requiring 
the physical exchange of shares.87 
 
The litigation arose because of the Attorney General’s refusal to 
accept the amendment, not because East Midtown was attempting to 
privatize through amending its certificate of incorporation.  East 
Midtown held a shareholder vote to pass the amendment using a “one-
vote-per-share rule” rather than a “one-vote-per-household” formula as 
directed by its certificate of incorporation.88  Therefore, East Midtown 
petitioned the court to compel the Attorney General to accept its 
amendment and to declare “that the Attorney General lacked 
jurisdiction over East Midtown’s efforts to exit the Mitchell-Lama 
program on the theory that the Martin Act did not apply to the 
transaction.”89  Essentially, East Midtown asked the court to determine 
whether the Attorney General had jurisdiction to oversee Mitchell-
Lama cooperative conversions by requiring the cooperative to file an 
offering plan with the Attorney General.90  The government argued 
that the Attorney General has authority pursuant to the General 
Business Law Article 23 (the “Martin Act”)91 which regulates the offer 
and sale of securities within or from New York.92 
The Martin Act requires that a person file an offering plan with 
 
 86  Id.  
 87  Id.  
 88  Id. at 243–44.  
 89  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244. 
 90  Id. (“East Midtown argues that it should not have been required to file an 
offering plan because the Attorney General lacks authority over its withdrawal from 
the Mitchel-Lama program.”).  The secondary issue in this case involves whether a vote 
for dissolution by a Mitchell-Lama cooperative whose certificate of incorporation is 
expressly silent on the issue should be on a per share or a per apartment basis.  Id. at 
247. 
 91  Id. at 244 (“[H]owever it is packaged, the privatization of a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative complex comfortably falls within the parameters of the Martin Act.”).   
 92  Kralik v. 239 E. 79th St. Owners Corp., 832 N.E.2d 707, 709 (2005) (“The Martin 
Act governs the offer and sale of securities in and from New York State, including 
securities representing ‘participation interests’ in cooperative apartment buildings.  
The Attorney General bears sole responsibility for implementing and enforcing the 
Martin Act, which grants both regulatory and remedial powers aimed at detecting, 
preventing and stopping fraudulent securities practices.”). 
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the New York State Attorney General prior to making or participating 
in “a public offering or sale” of securities consisting of participation 
interests or investments in real estate.93  Under the Martin Act, the 
Attorney General reviews cooperative apartments’ “disclosures 
required by General Business Law § 352-e for sufficiency” and 
investigates and initiates civil or criminal actions when fraud is 
suspected.94  The purpose of these required disclosures is to safeguard 
the purchasers of cooperatives and condominiums.95  East Midtown 
argued that the Martin Act does not apply to a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative attempting to privatize upon dissolution by amending its 
certificate of incorporation, because the transaction does not involve 
an “offering or sale” of securities.96 
The New York Court of Appeals held that the Attorney General 
does have jurisdiction to govern the dissolution and privatization of a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative pursuant to the Martin Act.97  To arrive at 
this conclusion, the Court analyzed whether the act of amending a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation as a means to 
privatize amounted to a “sale or offering” for the purposes of the 
Martin Act.98  In its analysis, the Court looked to federal securities law 
for guidance, acknowledging that the Martin Act was drafted similarly 
to the federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934.99  In support of its 
practice of referencing federal securities law and federal court 
decisions interpreting federal securities law, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the remedial purposes of the state and federal securities 
statutes are the same and that “the General Business Law § 352e–(1)(a) 
makes specific reference to the Federal Securities Act of 1933.”100 
With regard to federal securities law, federal courts have held that 
in certain situations altering the rights of shareholders of existing 
securities can constitute a “purchase or sale.”101  When determining 
 
 93  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244 (citing GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-e).  
 94  Kralik, 832 N.E.2d at 709.  
 95  Kerusa Co. LLC v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. P’ship, 906 N.E.2d 1049, 879 
(N.Y. 2009). 
 96  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244.  
 97  Id. at 244–46.  
 98  Id. at 245.  
 99  Id. (“Although the Martin Act was enacted in 1921, its present form generally 
tracks the Federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934.  Accordingly, we have looked to 
Federal court decisions construing those statutes when interpreting our own.”) 
(quoting People v. Landes, 645 N.E.2d 716, 718 (N.Y. 1994)).  
 100  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rachmani Corp., 525 
N.E.2d 704, 726 (N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted)).  
 101  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245. 
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whether a change in the rights of shareholders amounts to a “purchase 
or sale” of securities, federal courts generally consider the following 
factors: (1) “whether there has occurred such significant change in the 
nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a 
new investment;”102 and (2) what the economic reality of the 
transaction is and “whether it lends itself to fraud in the making of an 
investment decision.”103  New York courts have similarly applied the 
federal courts’ analysis of placing emphasis on substance and 
economic reality over form when determining a sale or purchase of 
security.104 
In East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo, the Court found that 
East Midtown’s act of amending its certificate of incorporation to 
remove itself from the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program would result 
in substantial changes to the nature of its shareholders’ interests.105  
After effectuating privatization, the tenant-shareholders would be able 
to sell their shares at market rate prices, whereas under the Mitchell-
Lama program, the same shareholders would be limited to the not-for-
profit resale price of shares under Mitchell-Lama law.106  Tenant-
shareholders no longer would be limited to selling their shares to 
purchasers who meet the qualifications of Mitchell-Lama’s income 
restrictions for tenants.  Additionally, privatization would result in the 
loss of government subsidized financing and certain property tax 
exemptions and tax benefits.107  Effectuating privatization may also 
result in potential increases to maintenance charges for each tenant-
shareholder.  Privatization would also enable the cooperative to 
impose a “flip tax” to be paid to the housing company from the 
proceeds of each subsequent sale of shares after dissolution.108 
In light of these changes in shareholders’ rights upon 
 
 102  Gelles v. TDA Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 
(1978)) (internal quotations omitted).   
 103  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245 (quoting THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 12.6.[1] (2013)); see also Rathborne 
v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The crucial question is not whether 
the transaction fulfills the requisites of a common law sale; the core issue is whether 
the transaction has transformed the plaintiff into the functional equivalent of a 
purchaser or seller-has the plaintiff been forced to exchange his stock for shares 
representing a participation in a substantially different enterprise?”).   
 104  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245. 
 105  Id. at 246. 
 106  Id.  
 107  Id.  
 108  Id.  
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privatization, the Court of Appeals correctly deduced that excluding 
this type of cooperative conversion from the ambit of the Martin Act 
would elevate form over substance.109  The Court concluded that 
whether the housing company effectuates dissolution through a 
formal reconstitution and physical exchange of shares or through 
amending its certificate of incorporation, the economic realities of 
both transactions have the same results—”privatization and market 
value resale potential.”110  Therefore, to protect the public from any 
fraud in the “offering and sale” of securities,111 the Attorney General 
properly has jurisdiction to require a Mitchell-Lama cooperative 
contemplating dissolution to file an offering plan pursuant to the 
Martin Act so shareholders can be informed when deciding the 
benefits and drawbacks of withdrawal from the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program.112 
IV.  MITCHELL-LAMA DISSOLUTION: TAX ISSUES PROMPTED BY TRUMP 
VILLAGE SECTION 3, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
Similar to East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo, where the 
Court had to determine whether the transaction of amending a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to dissolve 
and reconstitute was an offering and sale under securities law, the 
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York also had to 
categorize the transaction under tax law.  Trump Village Section 3, Inc. 
(“Trump Village”) consists of three, twenty-three-story buildings in 
Brooklyn that incorporated in 1961 under the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program.113  Like any typical Mitchell-Lama cooperative, Trump Village 
received a low interest mortgage loan from the government and real 
property tax exemptions but had to abide by the program’s restrictions 
on resale to third parties.114  Trump Village remained in the Mitchell-
Lama Housing Program for approximately forty-five years and repaid 
 
 109  Id. 
 110  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 246. 
 111  Id. at 245 (“We have emphasized that General Business Law § 352–e 
(1)(a) should be liberally construed to give effect to its remedial purpose of protecting 
the public from fraudulent exploitation in the offer and sale of securities”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 35 
(N.Y. 1986)). 
 112  Id. at 246. 
 113  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014). 
 114  Id.   
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its governmental mortgage loan on October 15, 2005.115  In 2007, with 
the permission of the State of New York and upon receiving the 
necessary shareholders’ vote, Trump Village elected to exit out of the 
Mitchell-Lama Program pursuant to § 35 of the PHFL, reconstituting 
itself as a private corporation under the New York Business 
Corporation Law116 through amending its certificate of 
incorporation.117  Trump Village removed language referencing the 
PHFL from its stock certificates and bylaws, exchanging old stock 
certificates for new ones without altering the number of shares.118  The 
housing company kept its original name, number of and names of its 
shareholders, and its tax identification number.119  After Trump Village 
terminated its participation in the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program, 
the New York City Department of Finance (“City Department”) issued 
a tax deficiency notice to Trump Village in the amount of 
$21,149,592.50 with interest and penalties for failing to pay a real 
property transfer tax (hereinafter “RPTT”) pursuant to New York State 
Tax Law § 1201(b) and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 
11-2102(a).120 
The issue in this case hinged on the interpretation of New York 
City’s tax law, determining whether amending a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to effectuate privatization 
constitutes a taxable transfer or conveyance for the purposes of 
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11-2102(a), a city tax 
empowered by New York State Tax Law § 1201(b).121  Generally and 
with qualifications, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11-
2102(a) imposes a tax “on each deed at the time of delivery by a 
grantor to a grantee when the consideration for the real property and 
any improvement thereon (whether or not included in the same deed) 
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.”122  The tax is applicable to 
conveyances of real property exceeding $25,000.123  While Trump 
 
 115  Id. at 472. 
 116  The New York Business Law governs the formation and dissolution of private 
corporations. N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 201 (McKinney 2013) (“A corporation may be formed 
under this chapter for any lawful business purpose or purposes except to do in this 
state any business for which formation is permitted under any other statute of this state 
unless such statute permits formation under this chapter.”).  
 117  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc., 974 N.Y.S.2d at 472.  
 118  Id.  
 119  Id. 
 120  Id.   
 121  Id.  
 122  Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11-2102(a).  
 123  Id.  
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Village argued that reconstitution under the Mitchell-Lama Housing 
Program is not a conveyance of real property,124 the City Department 
considered the transaction a conveyance of underlying real property 
between the “old” Mitchell-Lama cooperative to the “new” private 




The New York Supreme Court “awarded summary judgment to 
the City defendants declaring that Trump Village’s actions constituted 
a ‘transfer’ and a ‘conveyance’ of real property, and that Trump Village 
was subject to the RPTT.”126  The plaintiff, however, appealed to the 
appellate division, which reversed the lower court’s decision.  The 
appellate division agreed with Trump Village and found that Trump 
Village “did not transfer or convey real property or an interest in real 
property within the meaning of New York State Tax Law § 1201(b) and 
Administrative Code of City of New York § 11-2102(a),” holding that 
the housing company essentially remained the same entity except for 
the removal of some restrictions.127  Alternatively, the appellate division 
also noted that an exception under § 11-2106(b)(8) of the city’s tax 
code that imposes the RPTT specifically to transfers of land and 
buildings to a cooperative housing corporation, even if the 
transactions merely effect a change in ownership, was inapplicable. 128  
It found the exception irrelevant by concluding that § 11-2102(a) did 
not apply on its face to a housing cooperative terminating its 
participation in the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program.129  The City 
Department appealed the case to the New York Court of Appeals, and 
 
 124  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014). 
 125  Id. at 474 (“Here, the City defendants essentially contend that, by voluntarily 
dissolving and subsequently reconstituting, Trump Village became a new corporation 
and that, accordingly, the amended certificate of incorporation constituted a deed.  
Thus, they conclude that the purported deed was delivered at the time of execution, 
and that the purported deed was delivered by an ‘old’ Trump Village to a ‘new’ Trump 
Village.”). 
 126  Id. at 472–73.  
 127  Id. at 475.  
 128  Id. (“[T]he City defendants cannot establish the applicability of the RPTT by 
reference to a statutory exemption which would only be relevant if the tax were 
applicable in the first instance”) (citing Matter of Grace v. New York State Tax 
Common., 332 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1975)).  
 129  Id. 
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the Court affirmed the appellate division’s decision.130 
V. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS GOT IT WRONG IN TRUMP 
VILLAGE SECTION 3, INC. 
A.   The Decision in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. Elevates Form over 
Substance 
Although confronted with the same transaction, the Court of 
Appeals in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. categorized the voluntary 
dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative as an “offering and sale,” 
an essential transfer under securities law.131  In contrast, the Court in 
Trump Village Section 3, Inc. did not categorize the same method of 
dissolution and privatization as a “transfer” for the purposes of 
assessing real estate transfer taxes.132  In fact, the Court in Trump Village 
Section 3, Inc. glossed over the relevance of the fairly recent decision in 
East Midtown Plaza Housing Co.  While the Court explicitly recognized 
that “[t]he [prior] decision addressed the impact of privatization on 
shareholders and focused on the rights of the shareholders, and the 
substantial changes in the nature of their interests,” the Court dismissed the 
significance of its only precedent regarding Mitchell-Lama 
dissolutions.133  With one conclusory statement and without a 
developed discussion of why its prior decision was not controlling, the 
Court simply stated that “[East Midtown Plaza Housing Co.] lends no 
support for defendants’ imposition of an RPTT where there has been 
a Mitchell-Lama privatization.”134  The Court failed to consider, 
however, that its reasoning in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. for how 
the dissolution of Mitchell-Lama housing affects and changes the 
substantial rights of its shareholders directly supports reversing the 
appellate division in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York.135  
Amending one’s certificate of incorporation to dissolve a Mitchell-
Lama housing company is a valid transfer that triggers real property 
transfer taxes, considering the significant changes in ownership rights 
and in the nature of the property. 
Moreover, analysis of the relevant tax laws at issue in Trump Village 
 
 130  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1087 (N.Y. 
2014). 
 131  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 246 (N.Y. 2012). 
 132  Compare E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 240, with Trump Vill. Section 3, 
Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1086. 
 133  Trump Village Section 3, Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1089 (emphasis added).  
 134  Id.  
 135  See E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 246. 
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Section 3, Inc. demonstrates that the voluntary dissolution of a Mitchell-
Lama cooperative through amending its certificate of incorporation is 
a taxable transfer contemplated by both the New York State and New 
York City tax laws.  The relevant statute discussed in Trump Village 
Section 3, Inc. is § 1201 of the New York State tax law, which gives New 
York City authority to promulgate tax codes, including Administrative 
Code of the City of New York § 11-2102.136  The appellate division in 
Trump Village Section 3, Inc. noted that New York City only argued for 
the imposition of the city RPTT on the basis of part (a) of § 11-2102 
and never reached the merits of whether a voluntary dissolution of a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative is considered a taxable transfer under part 
(b) or part (c) of the city’s tax code.137  Generally, § 11-2102(a) requires 
imposition of a tax on “each deed at the time of delivery by a grantor 
to a grantee when the consideration for the real property and any 
improvement thereon (whether or not included in the same deed) 
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.”138  The subsequent subsections of 
part (a) provide the details as to how the tax is applied and at what 
rates, but the Court of Appeals in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. was only 
concerned about whether or not the tax should be imposed upon a 
particular kind of Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s voluntary dissolution.139  
To understand the different components of § 11-2102(a), the 
administrative code provides definitions for significant terms used in 
subsequent sections of the city’s tax law.  For example, the relevant 
term “deed” is defined as: 
Any document or writing (other than a will), regardless of 
where made, executed or delivered, whereby any real 
property or interest therein is created, vested, granted, 
bargained, sold, transferred, assigned or otherwise conveyed, 
including any such document or writing whereby any 
 
 136  N.Y. TAX § 1201 (McKinney 2013) (“[A]ny city in this state having a population 
of one million or more, acting through its local legislative body, is hereby authorized 
and empowered to adopt and amend local laws imposing in any such city any or all of 
the types of taxes set forth in the following subdivisions of this section, such taxes to 
be administered and collected by the fiscal officers of such city.”). 
 137  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 475 n.1 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014).  
 138  ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 11-2102(a).  
 139  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014) (“We 
are presented with the following question: Does a taxable transfer pursuant to Tax Law 
§ 1201 (b) and section 11-2102 (a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York 
occur when a residential housing cooperative corporation terminates its participation 
in the Mitchell-Lama program and amends its certificate of incorporation as part of its 
voluntary dissolution and reconstitution as a cooperative corporation governed by the 
Business Corporation Law?”).  
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leasehold interest in real property is granted, assigned or 
surrendered.140 
For the purposes of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative dissolution, the deed 
in the transaction is manifested in the certificate of incorporation.  By 
amending the certificate of incorporation, the cooperative, in writing, 
is able to transfer, grant, or assign the real property—the cooperative 
building and possibly the land underneath it—from the old affordable 
housing cooperative under the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program to the 
new private housing cooperative that will be incorporated under the 
state’s Business Corporation Law.  The notion of a “deed” for the 
relevant city tax law is loosely defined to contemplate other written 
documents that effectively provide the mode for transferring real 
property interests, demonstrating an emphasis on substance over form. 
 
 
Another pertinent definition for understanding § 11-2102(a) is 
the meaning of the term “economic interest in real property,” which 
the code defines as including “the ownership of shares of stock in a 
corporation which owns real property.”141  In both East Midtown Plaza 
Housing Co. and Trump Village Section 3, Inc., there was no dispute 
among the parties that the shareholders of a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative hold economic interests in real property.  Like 
shareholders in traditional private cooperatives, the tenant-owners of 
a Mitchell-Lama cooperative each hold shares within the housing 
company and have rights to the real property where the tenant-
shareholders reside.142 
The Court of Appeals in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. also did not 
directly address the administrative code’s § 11-2106(b) exemption.  It 
agreed with the appellate division, articulating that because § 11-
2102(a) does not apply on its face, the exemption “only applies where 
there has been a conveyance in the first place, and thus, because there 
was no conveyance, the exemptions and the exceptions to those 
exemptions are not relevant.”143  Nevertheless, the Court in reaching 
its conclusion still echoed the language and concerns of § 11-2106(b) 
even if it stated that the exemption was irrelevant.  The Court 
 
 140  ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 11-2101(2).  
 141  Id. § 11-2101(6).  
 142  NYC Administrative Code § 11-2101 (defining real property as “[e]very estate 
or right, legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent, in lands, tenements 
or hereditaments, which are located in whole or in part within the city of New York”).  
 143  Trump Village Section 3, Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1089.  
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addressed whether or not Trump Village became a new corporation,144 
which is relevant because under the § 11-2106 exemption the tax 
imposed by this code shall not apply to: 
A deed, instrument or transaction conveying or transferring 
real property or an economic interest therein that effects a 
mere change of identity or form of ownership or organization to the 
extent the beneficial ownership of such real property or 
economic interest therein remains the same, other than a 
conveyance to a cooperative housing corporation of the land and 
building or buildings comprising the cooperative dwelling or 
dwellings.145 
Not only did the Court find that the city’s transfer tax did not apply, 
but the Court supported its conclusion by reasoning that Trump 
Village remained the same entity.  Yet, the § 11-2106 exemption applies 
specifically to transactions where the ownership or organization of the 
real property or economic interest effectively remains the same.  
Therefore, by providing a carve out for instances where an 
organization reorganizes through a mere change in identity, the 
legislature qualitatively recognized that these types of transactions 
would normally fall within the ambit of this tax code as written, but for 
the inclusion of this exemption. 
The Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. incorrectly dismissed the 
relevance of the § 11-2106(b)(8) exemption.  The legislature would 
not have explicitly addressed the kinds of transactions that result in the 
ownership or organization remaining the same if these types of 
transfers would not otherwise fall with § 11-2102 in the first instance.  
Therefore, not only does § 11-2102 apply to Mitchell-Lama cooperative 
conversions to for-profit entities, but the method of conveyance at 
issue in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. is described specifically by the 
legislature in § 11-2106(b)(8). 
Although § 11-2106(b)(8) functions to waive the RPTT for certain 
transactions, dissolution and reconstitution of a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative through an amendment of its certificate of incorporation 
is excluded from the § 11-2106(b)(8) waiver in two ways.  Most 
conspicuously, the statute explicitly provides a caveat that bars 
conveyances to cooperative housing corporations of real property 
comprising a cooperative dwelling from being exempt from the 
 
 144  Id. at *4–6. (“We first address defendants’ argument that Trump Village became 
an entirely new corporation.”). 
 145  Administrative Code of the City of NY § 11-2106(b)(8) (emphasis added).  
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RPTT.146  Here, the transfer of economic interest in real property is 
between the old Mitchell-Lama cooperative and the newly 
reincorporated private cooperatives.  The plain text of § 11-2106(b)(8) 
alone already limits the waiver of RPTT from extending to conveyances 
to cooperative dwelling units. 
Alternatively, the § 11-2106(b)(8) exemption may not even apply 
as an initial matter because the transaction involves a corporation 
significantly changing the substance of its ownership, organization, 
and operation so as to create a new corporation.  As the Court of 
Appeals reiterated in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co., the dissolution 
process for a Mitchell-Lama cooperative involves a substantive change 
of rights and interests of the shareholders, not just a mere change in 
identity or ownership.147  Therefore, assuming that § 11-2102 on its face 
applies since Mitchell-Lama conversions are conveyances of real 
property through amendments to their certificate of incorporations 
(effectively deeds) for amounts over the statutory requirement, the 
transaction may be characterized as beyond mere changes in 
ownership.  Thus, these cooperatives which are attempting to privatize 
would not be exempt from paying RPTT under § 11-2106(b)(8). 
The Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. failed to recognize that 
amending one’s certificate of incorporation to remove references to 
the PHFL and placing the prior Mitchell-Lama housing company 
within the purview of the Business Corporation Law is not just a mere 
technical change in form.  The once affordable housing company that 
functioned under the restrictions, protections, and benefits of the 
Mitchell-Lama housing program will dissolve and seize to exist.  As a 
result, the newly reorganized housing company will be subject to the 
private housing market without supervision from government agencies 
like the Department of Housing and Community Renewal or the 
Housing Preservation Department. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. ignored the 
substantial changes that shareholders of a Mitchell-Lama housing 
company endure after privatization.  It simply noted that 
reincorporation “cannot be deemed the formation of a new 
corporation, but should be regarded as the continuation of the 
existing one.”148  In support of this conclusion, the Court improperly 
 
 146  Id.  
 147  E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 246 (N.Y. 2012). 
 148  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1089 (N.Y. 2014) 
(citing People ex rel. Consol. Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Secretary of State, 13 
A.D. 50, 51 (N.Y. App. Div.1897)). 
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relied on People ex rel. Consol. Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Secretary 
of State, a case from 1857 involving an already private corporation (not 
even a housing corporation) that amended its certificate of 
incorporation to proceed under the Business Corporation Law.  This 
case, however, is distinguishable because it involves an already existing 
private company that was once incorporated under the Manufacturing 
Act of 1848 but had decided to amend its certificate of incorporation 
so that it may be organized under the Business Corporation Law.149 
With the dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama housing company, the 
change in substantial ownership rights is much more significant than 
substituting reference to one act over another.  Amending its 
certificate of incorporation to remove references to the PHFL is akin 
to the other available dissolution option where the housing company 
formally transfers its assets to a newly-incorporated private cooperative 
with a formal issuance of new shares.150  The economic reality of the 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative transforms to the point that tenant rents 
are affected, the value of shareholders’ units increase dramatically, and 
future tenant-purchasers will no longer be subjected to income 
restrictions.151  Contrary to the Court’s interpretation in Trump Village 
Section 3, Inc., the prior Mitchell-Lama affordable housing company 
does not continue after privatization.  It dissolves completely.  The 
housing cooperative that reemerges from this process is wholly private 
and subject to market rates.  Thus, the change from a quasi-public 
housing company to a purely private housing company is a significant 
and substantive shift beyond mere formalities, necessitating the 
payment of the relevant real property transfer taxes. 
B.   Analogies between New York City and the State’s Real Estate 
Transfer Tax 
Tax legislation should be applied in a way that gives effect to the 
economic substance of a transaction.152  To understand the full extent 
and appropriate implementation of tax legislation, courts should be 
cognizant of its legislative history.  For example, Administrative Code 
of the City of NY § 11-2102 mirrors New York State Tax Law § 1402(a), 
which states that a real estate transfer tax is “imposed on each 
 
 149  See generally People ex rel. Consol. Kan. City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Sec’y of State, 
13 A.D. 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897).  
 150  See generally discussion supra Part C. 
 151  Id.  
 152  595 Investors Ltd. P’ship v. Biderman, 531 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1988).  
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conveyance of real property or interest therein when the consideration 
exceeds five hundred dollars, at the rate of two dollars for each five 
hundred dollars or fractional part thereof.”153  The state tax law 
describes conveyance as: 
the transfer or transfers of any interest in real property by any 
method, including but not limited to sale, exchange, 
assignment, surrender, mortgage foreclosure, transfer in lieu 
of foreclosure, option, trust indenture, taking by eminent 
domain, conveyance upon liquidation or by a receiver, or 
transfer or acquisition of a controlling interest in any entity 
with an interest in real property[.]154 
Again, the definition of “transfer” for the purposes of the state real 
property tax does not exclude the transaction involved when a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative amends its certificate of incorporation to 
effectuate dissolution and privatization.  Like the New York City 
administrative code, the state tax statute also has an exemption to its 
real estate transfer tax (RETT) similar to Administrative Code of the 
City of NY § 11-2106(b).  The New York State Tax Law § 1405(b)(6) 
provides that the state RETT does not apply when the conveyance 
“effectuates a mere change of identity or form of ownership or 
organization where there is no change in beneficial ownership.”155  
Like the New York City code, the state tax law contemplates 
transactions where an entity reorganizes and provides an exemption to 
the tax law for those instances.  For example, the New York State Tax 
Appeals Tribunal held that § 1405(b)(6) did not apply to a merger of 
CBS Corporation and Viacom, Inc.156  Like Trump Village Section 3, Inc., 
the merger involved a restatement in Viacom’s certificate of 
incorporation, but no issuance of “new” stock.157  The Tribunal held 
that the merger “resulted in a taxable conveyance of an interest in real 
property by CBS to Viacom.”158  In reaching this conclusion, the 
administrative law judge noted that the exemption under § 1405(b)(6) 
only applied where there was no change in “beneficial ownership” and 
 
 153  N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1402(a).  Similar to Administrative Code of the City of NY 
§ 11-2102, this real property transfer tax contemplates a monetary threshold in order 
to apply to the transaction.  
 154  N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1401(e).  
 155  N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1405(b)(6).  
 156  Maria T. Jones and Melissa S. Blades, 2006-2007 Survey of New York Law: Article: 
State and Local Taxation, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2008) (citing In re Viacom, 
Inc., 5 N.Y. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 405-723, at 45,607, 45,610 (N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib. May 
3, 2007)). 
 157  Id. at 1141.  
 158  Id.  
ROSCA(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:10 PM 
972 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:945 
 
where “beneficial ownership” is something more than a mere financial 
interest, articulating that “beneficial ownership” was marked by 
“dominion and control over the property.”159 
In applying the statutory interpretation of the Viacom case to a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative attempting dissolution, a change in 
“dominion and control over the property” is evident.  Most 
significantly, after dissolution, the shareholders will be able to control 
the selling price of the unit.  In addition, shareholders will also be free 
from the restriction imposed by the Mitchell-Lama program of 
conveying their units to only buyers within certain income ranges.  The 
housing corporation will also have control over the ability to impose 
“flip taxes” on sales subsequent to dissolution in order to raise revenue 
for the cooperative.  If the state collects tax revenue from RETT upon 
dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative, then New York City should 
not be barred from receiving this revenue when the city code and the 
state tax law are nearly identical in language and function. 
To support the contention that the New York State real property 
transfer tax is applicable to a Mitchell-Lama cooperative effectuating 
dissolution through amending its certificate of incorporation, the New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance (the “Department”) 
released an advisory opinion on the issue.160  The advisory opinion 
confronted the same transaction before the Court in Trump Village. 
Section 3, Inc. where a property located in New York City, organized 
under the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program, and supervised by a 
government agency, DHCR, attempted to dissolve and privatize 
through amending its certificate of incorporation.161  The Department 
concluded that “the conversion of the not-for-profit housing company 
(PHFL company) to a private cooperative housing corporation (BCL 
corporation) constitutes a conveyance . . . of the real property 
comprising the cooperative dwelling, subject to the [state real estate 
transfer tax].”162 
The Department also addressed similar concerns that the Court 
in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. considered—namely, whether the 
transaction constituted a transfer or conveyance of real property and 
whether the transaction fell into the exemption with the tax law with 
 
 159  Id.  
 160  See N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., Advisory Op. TSB-A-10(2)(R), 
available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/advisory_opinions/real_estate/a10_2r.pdf. 
 161  Id.  
 162  Id.  
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regard to change in ownership.163  The Department recognized that 
while the transfer of ownership of real property may not be the 
conventional method, dissolution of the non-for-profit housing 
cooperative must still occur in order to remove the restrictions 
imposed by the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program.164  Unlike the Court 
in Trump Village Section 3, Inc., which did not find removal of these 
limitations significant (considering it failed to even discuss them),165 
the Department noted that the dissolution and privatization would 
result in a “substantive change in the nature of the ownership of the 
entity that owns the property,” affecting the benefits and restrictions 
of the appurtenant shares.166 
 
Both state and city real estate transfer tax statutes also allude to 
the need for “consideration” as part of the transfer of real property 
which would implicate these taxes.167  Although not addressed by the 
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc., the Department had no issue in 
finding consideration in these types of transactions, referring to 
consideration as the “amount of cash received by the Sponsor; the 
amount of any mortgages, liens, or encumbrances on the real 
property; and the fair market value of the shares in the cooperative 
housing corporation after reconstitution.”168  In analyzing how the state 
real estate transfer tax is implicated upon this transaction, the 
Department first recognized that the significant changes in rights by 
the shareholders regarding ownership of the cooperative dwelling 
 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1088 (N.Y. 2014) 
(“While defendants assert that a new corporation must have been formed because 
Trump Village had to ‘dissolve’ under the PHFL before ‘reconstituting’ as a 
corporation no longer governed by the restrictions of the PHFL, the corporation in 
the amended certificate of incorporation, Trump Village Section 3, Inc., is the same 
corporation that was named in the original certificate of incorporation.”); see also 
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 474–75 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014) (“Upon amending its certificate of 
incorporation, Trump Village remained the same entity, although it was relieved of 
various restrictions previously imposed upon it by the Mitchell-Lama housing 
program.”).  
 166  N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., supra note160. 
 167  Compare Administrative Code of the City of NY § 11-2102(a) (“tax is hereby 
imposed on each deed at the time of delivery by a grantor to a grantee when the 
consideration for the real property . . . .”) (emphasis added) with N.Y. CLS TAX § 1402 
(“A tax is hereby imposed on each conveyance of real property or interest therein 
when the consideration exceeds five hundred dollars . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 168  N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., supra note 160. 
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already implicate the state real estate transfer tax on its face.  
Nevertheless, like the city tax law, the state transfer tax also has an 
exemption for transactions that effectuate mere changes in identity.  
Here, the Department held that amending its certificate of 
incorporation was a mere change in ownership or organization, 
especially because the percentage of shares in the old cooperative 
would remain for the new cooperative.  Like the city tax law, however, 
the state exemption to RETT has a caveat for “conveyances to a 
cooperative housing corporation of real property comprising the 
cooperative dwellings.”169  Hence, the transaction falls within the 
purview of this state tax statute, and its special exemption for mere 
changes in ownership does not apply. 
The legislative history of § 1201—which authorizes New York 
City’s ability to impose the real estate transfer tax—also supports the 
contention that tax statutes like Administrative Code of the City of New 
York § 11-2102 were intended to close gaps and loopholes in real 
property transfer taxes by “permitting the taxation of transfers of 
controlling interest in corporations . . . which own real property.”170  
Allowing a Mitchell-Lama cooperative to take advantage of a loophole 
by avoiding an otherwise applicable transfer tax due to the method of 
how the cooperative dissolves and privatizes would be contrary to the 
purpose for these types of transfer taxes.  Section 1201 was amended 
to include real property “transfers of controlling economic interest in 
real property,” recognizing that it is common to convey property 
without having it reflected in a traditional “deed.”171  Both the 
legislative history of § 1201 and the analysis of the Department 
regarding § 1405(b)(6) in ruling that these types of Mitchell-Lama 
dissolutions are subject to the state RETT manifest the purpose of 
these tax statutes, which is to give effect to the “substance of the 
transaction rather than legal form.”172 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals ignored its own precedent and 
issued a misguided decision in Trump Village Section 3, Inc.  The Court 
in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. had already ruled that amending a 
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to remove 
references to the Private Housing Finance Law is considered an 
 
 169  Id.  
 170  1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2636–37(McKinney); 1981 NY Legis. Ann., at 481. 
 171  1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2636–37(McKinney). 
 172  Id.  
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“offering or sale” for the purposes of securities law.  Rather than 
remain consistent and provide uniformity among laws regarding these 
same types of conversions, the Court of Appeals distinguished East 
Midtown Plaza Housing Co. in a cursory fashion.  The Court was 
persuaded that the housing company named in the amended 
certificate of incorporation was the same named company in the 
original Mitchell-Lama certificate of incorporation, despite its 
transformation into a completely private entity that would no longer 
be subject to any of the Mitchell-Lama housing regulations.  Thus, the 
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. concluded that this method of 
effectuating dissolution and privatization by a Mitchell-Lama 
cooperative is not a “transfer” pursuant to city and state tax laws.  
Analysis of New York City’s relevant real property transfer tax, however, 
demonstrates that this dissolution method is a transfer of a real 
property interest subject to real property transfer tax obligations.  
Additionally, both the state and local real estate tax laws contemplate 
transfers of property ownership or controlling interest through 
reorganization within the plain reading of the tax codes.  Further, 
because New York City’s tax law is based on the state’s tax law, the 
legislative history behind the state’s tax statute reveals the purpose of 
these types of transfer taxes.  A recent advisory opinion held that the 
state real estate transfer tax applies to a Mitchell-Lama cooperative 
seeking privatization through amending its certificate of 
incorporation.  Therefore, New York City’s similar transfer tax should 
also apply to the same transaction. 
Moreover, public policy concerns over preserving affordable 
housing stock in New York City supported the reversal of the appellate 
division in Trump Village Section 3, Inc; yet, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed without considering the implications of its decision.  Allowing 
these housing companies to gain the benefit of being exempted from 
real property transfer taxes both in the initial formation of the 
Mitchell-Lama housing and now in exiting the program would only 
provide more incentives for these cooperatives to privatize.  
Considering the present affordable housing crisis in New York City, the 
judiciary should have given effect to the purposes of these tax statutes.  
Generally, these real estate transfer taxes are more lenient on housing 
companies attempting to become affordable housing stock—to 
encourage the development of much needed affordable housing units.  
The state and local legislatures did not intend to forgo these transfer 
tax revenues for housing entities attempting to gain a profit by 
converting out of affordable housing programs to become private 
market rate housing.  This recent decision in Trump Village Section 3, 
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Inc. incentivizes the dissolution of low- and middle-income housing by 
allowing these entities to take advantage of tax waivers intended to 
promote the creation of affordable housing.  The only option left for 
preserving current Mitchell-Lama housing is through legislative action 
that would explicitly require all Mitchell-Lama housing cooperatives 
that are leaving the affordable housing program to pay the proper 
transfer taxes, regardless of how the cooperative attempts to effectuate 
dissolution.  Otherwise, New York City risks further depletion of this 
critical affordable housing stock. 
 
